New values, old basics: how leadership shapes support for inclusion by Nicholas Jans
New values, old basics:
How leadership shapes 
support for inclusion
Brigadier Nicholas Jans, OAM
September 2014
Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies
Australian Defence College






























its	 ‘true’	 identity.	While	this	is	of	course	the	approach	being	taken	in	Pathway	to	Change,	 the	effect	is	much	
more	powerful	when	the	message	comes	from	local	leaders	rather	than	from	the	distant	top.	
	
Finally,	 the	 key	 elements	 of	 the	 leader‐follower	 influence	 process	 can	 be	 expressed	 by	 a	 ‘3Rs’	 model	 of	
leadership.	This	proposes	that	 leaders	are	most	 influential	when	they	Reflect	what	 is	deemed	exemplary	 in	






paucity	 of	 research	 on	ADF	 leadership,	 such	 assessments	 are	 necessarily	 speculative.	While	 there	 is	 some	
evidence	that	 the	 ‘reflecting’	element	 is	strong,	 the	 ‘relating’	element	seems	to	be	 less	so;	and	there	are	no	
indicators	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 assess	 the	 ‘reinforcing’	 element.	 The	 review	 proposes	 some	






over	 other	 organisations	 in	 creating	 and	 sustaining	 appropriate	 behavioural	 standards.	 Or	 to	 put	 the	
argument	slightly	differently:	if	the	ADF	can’t	do	this,	which	organisation	can?	



















I	will	 be	 ruthless	 in	 ridding	 the	 [Australian]	 Army	 of	 people	who	 do	 not	 stand	 up	 for	 its	 values.	 If	 you	







The	 General	 looks	 squarely	 at	 us	 through	 the	 camera’s	 lens.	 In	 blunt,	 no‐nonsense	 terms,	 he	 states	 his	
concerns	 regarding	 professional	 behaviour	 and	 his	 expectations	 of	 every	 person	 under	 his	 command.	 His	
words	 resonate	 not	 only	 through	 the	 Army	 but	 also	 through	 civilian	 society.	 In	 the	 stream	 of	 comments	




Well,	 yes—and	 no.	 For	 all	 its	 distinctive	 features,	 the	 military	 has	 many	 similarities	 with	 any	 large	
organisation,	in	that	expectations	don’t	always	penetrate	to	lower	levels	as	effectively	as	senior	leaders	would	
like.	 Senior	 leaders	 can	 certainly	 influence	 what	 people	 do	 but	 they	 are	 usually	 much	 less	 successful	 in	
shaping	how	people	think	and	feel.	
	
This	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	 findings	 of	 attitude	 surveys	 conducted	 in	 the	 months	
before	 and	 after	 the	 General’s	 message	 in	 June.4	 In	 May	 2013,	 only	 a	 small	
minority	 (32	 per	 cent)	 of	 those	 in	 the	 Army	 sample	 had	 expressed	 belief	 that	
‘senior	 leadership’	was	 committed	 to	Defence’s	overarching	program	of	 cultural	
reform	(Pathway	to	Change).5	By	the	following	October,	this	had	risen	slightly	to	
40	 per	 cent,	 with	 another	 slight	 rise	 (to	 45	 per	 cent)	 by	 February	 2014:	
improvements	 certainly	 but	 still	 reflecting	 somewhat	 unsupportive	 attitudes.	
Similarly,	 while	 only	 25	 per	 cent	 in	 May	 2013	 had	 regarded	 their	 immediate	
supervisor	as	being	committed	to	Pathway	to	Change,	the	subsequent	rises	(to	32	





4          YourSay: Organisational Climate Report (April 2014). YourSay was administered on-line to a 12.5 per cent  
random sample of Defence people in February and May 2013, to a 15 per cent random sample in October 






























However,	 as	 this	 review	 shows,	 values	 and	 perspectives	 can	 be	 changed,	
particularly	when	leaders	at	all	levels	are	focused	on	doing	so,	and	this	can	



















the	role	of	senior	 leadership.	 	To	overcome	this	problem,	 the	review	made	the	reasonable	assumption	that	
support	 for	 inclusion	 is	 simply	 one	 of	 a	 number	 of	 similar	 ethical	 attitudes/values	 that	 are	 amenable	 to	
leadership	 influence.	 Therefore,	 influence	 of	 support	 for	 inclusion	 entails	 processes	 similar	 to	 those	




decade.	 Many	 were	 based	 on	 research	 in	 military	 institutions.	 Particular	 attention	 was	 given	 to	 papers	
published	 in	 prestigious	 and	 influential	 journals,	 such	 as	 the	 Annual	 Review	 of	 Psychology	 series	 and	 the	
Journal	of	Applied	Psychology.	




















Virtually	 all	 contemporary	Western	 military	 organisations	 in	 developed	 nations	 aspire	 to	 ‘new	 values’	 in	
terms	 of	 support	 for	 inclusion.10	 Their	 aim	 is	 not	 only	 to	 sustain	 personnel	 strengths	 in	 the	 face	 of	
demographic	challenges	in	developed	nations	(a	shrinking	youth	population	and	a	fierce	war	for	talent)	but	
also	 to	 enhance	 and	 expand	 the	 ‘soft	 capability’	 now	 seen	 as	 a	 crucial	 element	 in	 operational	 and	
organisational	effectiveness.11		
	
While	 some	 people	 are	 apprehensive	 that	 inclusion	 degrades	 capability,	 there	 is	 no	 empirical	 evidence	 to	
support	such	a	view.	In	fact,	the	few	studies	that	have	investigated	military‐specific	issues	in	this	regard	tend	
to	 find	 that,	 at	 the	 least,	 inclusion	 does	 not	 reduce	military	 performance.12	 And	 the	 evidence	 is	much	 less	
equivocal	 for	 business	 organisations,	 particularly	 at	 the	 senior	management	 level,	 with	most	 such	 studies	
showing	that	business	performance	is	enhanced	by	the	inclusion	of	women	at	the	top.13	
	
































Virtually	 all	 contemporary	 Western	 military	 organisations	 also	 face	 the	 challenge	 of	 dealing	 with	
unsupportive	attitudes	among	the	male	majority.	This	is	discussed	in	a	recent	paper	in	a	leading	international	
military	sociology	journal	with	the	blunt	title	of	 ‘The	war	against	the	female	soldier?’.14	 It	documents	many	
examples	 from	 various	 armies	 that	 reveal	 ‘frequent	 aggression	 towards	 female	 soldiers,	 particularly	 in	
training	 centres	 and	 combat	 units,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 misogynistic	 jokes,	 denigrating	 glances	 and	 sexual	
harassment’.15	 Such	 indicators	 confirm	 that,	 while	 it	 is	 comparatively	 easy	 to	 embed	 traditional	 values	
(professionalism,	 service,	 courage,	 loyalty etc),16	 taking	 military	 people	 down	 the	 inclusion	 path	 from	
‘compliance’	to	‘acceptance’	to	‘commitment’	is	generally	a	very	different	matter.17		
	
There	 are	 a	 variety	of	 reasons	why	 this	 is	 the	 case.	To	begin	with,	military	
institutions	reflect	the	norms	of	their	broader	national	societies,	and	general	
indicators	of	 these	are	not	 encouraging.	For	example,	Australian	 surveys	of	




These	behaviours	and	 their	underlying	attitudes	often	have	deep	 roots.	A	 recent	 study	of	Australian	 social	






Military	 organisations	 are	 an	 obvious	 example	 of	 an	 ‘industry’	 with	 a	 traditional	 approach	 to	
inclusion/gender	 employment.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 they	 contain	 many	 distinctive	 psychological	 and	
sociological	 factors	 that	 add	 up	 to	 a	 formidable	 set	 of	 barriers	 to	 those	 who	 do	 not	 fit	 the	 conventional	
‘insider’	models.20	For	example,	the	military	has	a	‘tight’	culture	in	which	shared	identity,	social	stratification	
































as	 representing	 the	 predominant	 culture	 often	 exercise	 or	 threaten	 strong	 sanctions	 for	 deviations.	 Social	





moral	 maturity,	 they	 are	 particularly	 susceptible	 to	 informal	 norms,	 stereotypic	 prejudices	 and	 peer	
pressure.22	They	go	through	a	number	of	socialisation	events—recruit	training,	early	specialist	training,	and	
first	 appointment—while	 still	 at	 an	 impressionable	 age.	 While	 many	 will	 subsequently	 develop	 more	
informed	and	nuanced	views	and	values,	the	effects	of	many	of	the	more	unfortunate	attitudes	linger	for	some	
time.23	 The	 potential	 influence	 of	 contemporary	 social	 media—a	 topic	 that	 awaits	 more	 thorough	
examination	by	military	sociologists—is	an	additional	factor	in	moral	development.	
	
The	 very	 language	 that	 is	 common	 among	 men	 can	 be	 a	 source	 of	 reinforcing	
cultural	stereotypes.	Prime	examples	are	the	terms	‘mate’	and	‘mateship’.	Very	few	
men	use	 these	words	with	 an	 exclusion	motive	but	 they	do	not	 realise	 that	many	
women	do	not	relate	to	such	terms.24	Such	language	is	one	of	several	indicators	of	an	
unconscious	masculinity	at	work	 in	society	 that,	while	more	obvious	 to	women,	 is	
less	recognised	by	men.25	And,	despite	all	the	evidence	showing	that	women	leaders	
perform	at	least	as	well	as	men,	the	male	leadership	stereotype	is	deeply	embedded	
in	 the	 collective	 unconscious	 at	 a	 societal	 level.26	 Even	 though	 most	 women	 in	
management	 no	 longer	 see	 their	 roles	 in	 gender‐specific	 terms,	 many	 people—
women	as	well	as	men—continue	to	have	a	‘think	leader:	think	man’	mindset.27	































body	 of	 research	 on	 this	matter	 indicates	 that	 young	 servicemen	who	were	 led	 by	 female	 officers	 did	 not	
readily	 change	 their	male‐female	 prejudices	 as	 a	 consequence.28	 This	 is	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 available	
research—again,	 rather	 scanty	 and	confined	 to	 the	US	 service	academies—indicates	 few	differences	 in	 the	
leadership	styles	of	male	and	female	cadets.29		
	
Finally,	 the	 administrative	 culture	 of	 the	 ADF	 itself	 presents	 impediments.	 The	most	 recent	 report	 on	 the	
ongoing	audit	of	unacceptable	behaviour	in	the	ADF	noted	evidence	of	greater	understanding	of	the	issue	but	








The	ADF	 is	not	helping	 itself	by	using	a	questionable	model	of	 attitude	change.	 	 ‘YourSay	2014’	presents	a	
model	of	cultural	change	as	‘a	relatively	linear	process,	from	contactawarenessunderstandingpositive	
perceptionimpactadoptionembeddinginternalisation/commitment’.32	 This	 is	 a	 message‐based	
persuasion	 model	 of	 attitude	 change,	 which	 assumes	 that	 people	 change	 their	 attitudes	 when	 they	 are	






persuasion	 is	 that	 attitudes	 can	 be	 prey	 to	 powerful	 social	 and	 psychological	 forces	 that	 are	 counter	 to	
rational	 processing.34	 For	 example,	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons—because	 we	 seek	 rewards,	 want	 to	 avoid	




































can	 be	 found	 at	 every	 hand,	 ranging	 from	 rejection	 of	 climate	 science	 to	 views	 on	 politics	 and	 economic	
performance.37		
	
It	 is	 not	 surprising,	 therefore,	 that	 value	 judgments	 can	 often	 be	
inherently	 resistant	 to	 rational	 or	 moral	 persuasion.38	 Thus	 another	 way	 of	
interpreting	the	inference	from	the	YourSay	results	is	that	those	who	reported	
having	a	‘good	understanding’	of	Pathway	to	Change	were	those	who	concurred	







and	 when	 behaviour	 is	 reinforced	 by	 an	 organisational	 climate	 that	
signals	appropriate	conduct	and	related	rewards	and	sanctions.		
	





































Houston	was	able	 to	get	 those	at	 the	 top	 to	change	 their	approach	and	 to	 think	and	act	 in	an	 integrated	
manner	by	exerting	direct	and	indirect	influence	through	three	main	processes.	
	
First,	 Houston	 drew	 on	 the	 credibility	 accrued	 throughout	 his	 career	 and	 particularly	 in	 the	 previous	
decade.	He	was	widely	 respected	 for	 his	 variety	 of	 career	 experiences	 and	 his	 efforts	 in	 embedding	 the	
cultural	change	program	initiated	by	his	predecessor	as	Chief	of	the	Air	Force.	Just	as	importantly,	he	was	












of	 their	 appointments.	 He	 then	 had	 the	 new	 team	 spend	 time	 together	 in	 a	 two‐day	 retreat	 to	 explore	
issues	 and	 broad	 options,	 and	 to	 become	 used	 to	working	 as	 a	 ‘team’.	 Finally,	 in	 an	 inspired	move,	 he	
consolidated	 all	 this	 by	 insisting	 that	 the	 Service	 Chiefs	 be	 co‐located	 in	married	 quarters	 in	Duntroon:	
where,	 as	 one	put	 it,	 ‘we	used	 to	 see	 each	other	 across	 the	back	 fence’,	 just	 as	 they	had	earlier	 in	 their	
careers	 on	 Service	 bases.	 In	 such	 an	 environment,	 the	 three	 could	 scarcely	 avoid	 frequent	 and	 candid	
discussion	of	important	issues.		
	
The	 success	 of	 the	 strategy	 was	 illustrated	 by	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 new	 team	 developed	 the	 habit	 of	
networking	in	advance	of	senior	meetings.	They	quickly	got	to	the	stage,	as	one	put	it,	‘where	one	Service	
Chief	 would	 be	 prepared	 to	 argue	 the	 projects	 of	 another	 Service	 even	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 his	 own’.	 As	
another	put	 it,	 ‘we	fully	accept	that	each	Service	doesn’t	deliver	 its	own	form	of	military	power	by	itself.	
Rather,	 the	ADF	exists	 to	operate	as	an	entity,	so	we	should	make	strategic	decisions	with	that	 in	mind’.	




The	 approach	 used	 by	 CDF	 Houston	 involved	 three	 processes	 that	 are	 fundamental	 to	 values‐based	
leadership	at	any	level.	Leaders	establish	credibility	and	command	attention	by	practising	what	this	review	
calls	 the	 ‘3Rs’:	 ‘reflecting’	 the	 character	 and	 standards	 of	 the	 entity	 with	 which	 their	 followers	 identify;	
‘relating’	to	group	members	in	ways	that	engage	and	build	mutual	respect,	self‐esteem	and	self‐efficacy;	and	


































junior	 officers	 that	 ‘their	 authority	 will	 weaken’	 unless	 they	 appeared	 to	 be	 fit	 enough	 to	 do	 the	 various	
soldiers’	tasks	themselves.43			
	
Both	 the	 Murdoch	 and	 Masters	 examples	 above	 illustrate	 subtle	 but	 important	












































strongly	 with	 their	 group,	 48	 as	 will	 often	 be	 the	 case	 in	 the	 ADF.	 Thus	
legendary	Australian	World	War	1	 leader	Harold	 ‘Pompey’	Elliott	 told	his	7th	
Battalion	officers	 and	NCOs	 shortly	 after	 the	battalion	was	 formed	 that	 their	
task	 as	 leaders	was	 ‘to	make	 the	 7th	 as	 outstanding	 as	 Cromwell’s	 Ironsides,	
whose	 proud	 boast	 it	was	 after	 15	 years	 of	 service	 that	 no	 enemy	 had	 ever	
seen	their	backs’.49	A	classic	example	 from	the	corporate	world	 is	Steve	 Jobs’	
revitalisation	of	Apple,	when	he	 returned	 as	CEO	with	 a	 promise	 to	 take	 the	






prime	 ministers	 in	 hard	 hats	 on	 building	 sites.	 However,	 the	 specific	 indicators	 of	 prototypicality	 vary	
according	to	the	group	or	social/professional	entity	involved.	This	is	nicely	brought	out	in	a	recent	study	of	
language	 and	 culture	 in	 the	 Defence	 institution	 by	 Elizabeth	 Thomson,	 52	 who	 points	 to	 the	 differences	
between	 the	 APS	 ‘knowledge	 code’,	 which	 gives	 weight	 to	 qualifications,	 skills	 and	 experience	 (‘trust	 me	
because	 I	know’)	and	the	ADF	 ‘knower	code’,	which	gives	greater	weight	to	rank,	 function	and	tribal	status	
(‘trust	me	because	I	am	who	I	am’).	53		
















organization, HarperCollins: New York, 2008.    

























Similarly,	 acts	 that	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 indicative	 of	 a	 leader’s	 group‐oriented	motivation—that	 is,	 that	
show	 the	 leader’s	 commitment	 to	 the	 group	 interest—feed	 into	 acceptance	 and	 trust.	 This	 is	 a	 powerful	
reason	why	authority	 is	 enhanced	by	 actions	 such	as	 self‐sacrifice	on	behalf	 of	 the	 group,	 or	by	 allocation	




For	 example,	 it	 enhances	 their	 licence	 to	 depart	 from	 what	 the	 group	 may	 have	 previously	 regarded	 as	
‘normal’,	56	makes	them	more	likely	to	be	seen	as	charismatic,	trustworthy	and—regardless	of	the	context—
probably	 more	 ‘heroic’,	 and	 tends	 to	 give	 them	 greater	 leeway,	 with	 followers	 being	 more	 tolerant	 of	
occasional	poor	performance.57		
	







The	 second	 fundamental	 element	 of	 the	3Rs	 concerns	 the	 collective	 and	 individual	 relationships	 between	 a	
leader	and	the	group	and	its	members.		
	


























Australian	 vernacular,	 is	 ‘fair	 dinkum’).	 Authenticity	 has	 four	 main	 elements:	 active	 self‐awareness	 (for	
example,	seeking	feedback	about	their	interactions	with	others);	relational	transparency	(for	example,	being	
honest	and	willing	to	admit	mistakes);	 internalised	moral	perspective	(for	example,	acting	in	ways	that	are	
consistent	with	 espoused	values);	 and	balanced	processing	 (for	 example,	 actively	 seeking	 information	 that	















reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 behavioural	 outcomes	 were	 essentially	 due	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 NCOs’	
personal	styles.60		
	











































the	 team.	 The	 enhancement	 of	 the	 individual’s	 self‐esteem	 and	 sense	 of	 agency	 gets	 a	 further	psychological	
boost	 if	 the	 leader	gives	 them	some	autonomy	within	 their	own	situation.63	This	makes	 them	not	only	more	





Incidentally,	 there	 is	 a	 subtle	 but	 important	 difference	 between	 being	
supportive	 and	 being	 friendly.	 Pompey	 Elliott	 was	 renowned	 as	 a	 tough	
disciplinarian	but	his	soldiers	appreciated	his	being	‘absolutely	straight,	and	
incapable	 of	 deviousness:	 you	 knew	where	 you	 stood	with	 Pompey…	 and	
the	way	he	took	a	personal	interest	in	them	as	individuals,	even	though	he	
had	over	a	 thousand	men	under	his	 command’.65	And	Chris	Masters	notes	
that	 ‘if	 you	 asked	 the	 diggers	 about	 their	 commanders,	 the	 biggest	 thing	
they	will	 say	 is	 that	 they	are	good	at	 looking	after	us,	and	standing	up	 for	
us’.66		
	
The	 effect	 is	 amplified	 if	 the	 leader	 articulates	 a	 desired	 future	 state	 and,	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly,	 invites	
followers	 to	 join	 in	 the	 journey	 towards	 the	 relevant	 outcome	 (see	 the	 earlier	 example	 of	 Pompey	 Elliott’s	





involving	 and	 communicating	 with	 students’,	 with	 teaching	 excellence	 ‘dominated	 [by]	 non‐cognitive	




































It	 is	one	thing	to	exert	 influence	through	inspiration	and	individual	treatment:	 it	 is	
another	to	consolidate	that	behaviour	into	a	group	climate—that	is,	a	shared	set	of	












Such	 a	 climate	 and	 its	 effects	was	 the	 focus	of	 a	 recent	 set	 of	 studies	 conducted	 in	US	military	 and	 civilian	
organisations	 explored	 the	 processes	 involved	 in	 and	 the	 behavioural	 influences	 of	 establishing	 codes	 of	
behaviour	that	explicitly	defined	appropriate	conduct	and	standards	in	each	context.	
	
The	 climate	 in	 each	 organisation	 was	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 codes	 of	 behaviour	 that	 explicitly	 defined	
appropriate	local	conduct	and	standards.	The	code	of	behaviour	in	each	case	was	called	‘Duty	Orientation’,	
defined	 in	 terms	of	duty	 to	mission,	standards,	and	 team	and	members.	The	research	also	examined	the	
separate	effect	of	leadership	in	terms	of	the	‘authentic’	style	described	earlier.	Three	major	sets	of	findings	
emerged.	Firstly,	regardless	of	the	sample	and	organisation	involved—military	recruits,	junior	soldiers,	or	
corporate	 employees—Duty	 Orientation	 was	 invariably	 strongest	 in	 groups	 led	 in	 a	 way	 that	 could	 be	
broadly	 described	 as	 ‘authentic’.	 Secondly,	 the	 stronger	 the	 Duty	 Orientation,	 the	more	 ethical	 was	 the	























Figure	1	 illustrates	 the	processes	 involved.	 It	 shows	 that	 leadership	has	both	direct	and	 indirect	 influence.	
Direct	 influence	 comes	 from	example,	edict	or	supervision,	with	 indirect	 influence	coming	 from	the	ways	 in	


























with	 the	 indirect	 effect	 multiplying	 the	 direct	 effect	 at	 each	 level	 of	 individual	 leadership.	 At	 each	
organisational	 level,	 therefore,	 the	 ‘leadership	 total’	 effect—personal	 and	environmental—was	greater	
than	the	sum	of	its	individual	parts.	
	




















































Values	 and	 identity	 emulation	 can	 occur	 only	 when	 the	 leader	 gains	 implicit	
authority	 by	 reflecting	 group	 norms	 and	 relating	 supportively	 with	 followers.	
Followers	will	then	generally	respond	by	paying	more	attention	and	giving	more	

























long‐term,	 values‐based	 relationship	 between	 leader	 and	 follower	 continually	 (even	 if	 unconsciously)	
reminds	each	member	of	who	they	are	and	what	they	stand	for	both	as	an	individual	and	as	a	team	member.	
In	 turn,	 such	 followers	 are	 likely	 to	 play	 their	 part	 in	 shaping	 the	 values	 of	 incoming	 group	 members.	
Institutions	such	as	the	ADF	can	achieve	this	despite	a	high	rate	of	officer	job	rotation	and	‘churn’,	by	creating	






















The	 implication	 is	 that	 leadership	 effectiveness	 requires	 ‘the	 whole	 package’.	 Leaders	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	
perform	in	ways	that	exemplify	the	professional	standards	valued	by	the	group.	They	need	to	be	willing	and	
able	to	develop	strong	and	ethical	relationships	with	followers.	And	they	need	to	be	willing	and	able	to	embed	
appropriate	 behaviour	 with	 an	 ethical	 climate	 that	 guides	 appropriate	 conduct	 beyond	 the	 immediate	
influence	of	the	leader(s).	




































Those	 who	 lead	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 3Rs	 model	 create	 a	 motivational	 effect	 that	 turns	






the	 institution,	 so	 as	 to	 bring	 it	 closer	 to	 its	 ‘true’	 identity,	 the	 enacting	 of	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 make	 the	
institution	more	closely	resemble	its	ideal.	In	the	case	of	support	for	inclusion,	this	could	be	usefully	framed	







the	ADF’s	most	 important	 soft	 capability.	 It	might	 be	 expected	 therefore	 that	 such	 an	 ‘old	 basic’	would	be	





















show	 ADF	 officers	 as	 being	 strong	 on	 ‘task‐oriented’	 aspects	 of	 leadership	 but	 with	 some	 weaknesses	 in	





postgraduate	 thesis.	 The	 leadership	 styles	 of	 company	 commanders	 were	
measured	from	the	perspectives	of	both	the	company	commanders	themselves	and	
their	 subordinate	 officers.	 The	 findings	 of	 a	 population	 survey	 of	 all	 Army	 units	
mirror	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 research	 on	 emotional	 intelligence,	 in	
that	 company	 commanders	 at	 that	 time	 were	 relatively	 strong	 on	 task‐oriented	
aspects	of	leadership	and	relatively	weak	in	the	areas	of	subordinate	support	and	
relationships.	 For	 example,	 among	 the	 lower	 rated	 items	 by	 subordinate	 officers	
were	‘helps	others	develop	their	strengths’	(60%	either	agreed	or	strongly	agreed)	
and	 ‘spends	 time	 teaching	 and	 coaching’	 (46%).	 The	 company	 commanders	









 Inadequate	 understanding	 or	 appreciation	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 leaders	 must	 give	 appropriate	
attention	to	people	as	well	as	to	task;	
 A	lack	of	opportunity	for	junior	officers	to	develop	emotional	intelligence	capacity;	and	












shore	 establishments,	 as	measured	 by	 the	 ‘Human	 Synergistics’	 circumplex	model	 and	 its	 associated	 ‘Life	
Styles	Inventory’	instrument,	the	results	are	not	yet	publically	available.82		
	























Secondly,	 there	have	been	 surprisingly	 few	comparisons	between	 the	 leadership	styles	of	male	and	 female	


















Not	 only	 would	 cultural	 reform	 benefit	 considerably	 from	 research	 on	 core	
issues	 but	 such	 research	 could	 well	 be	 part	 of	 the	 method	 by	 which	 the	
Australian	 military	 institution	 demonstrates	 itself	 as	 something	 of	 which	 the	
nation	can	continue	to	be	proud.		
	
The	 reasons	 for	 this	 are	 not	 clear.	 Is	 it	 that	 the	 ADF’s	 pragmatic	 culture	 is	 unsympathetic	 to	 ‘academic’	
research?	Is	there	some	fear	that	research	results	might	be	used	by	the	media	and	cause	embarrassment?	Is	
there	 some	 apprehension	 that	 the	 myths	 of	 ADF	 leadership	 might	 not	 be	 reflected	 in	 objective	 reality?	
Whatever	the	reasons,	the	question	deserves	examination	at	the	most	senior	levels.	
	
And,	whatever	 such	 reasons,	 they	 should	 no	 longer	 be	 used	 as	 an	 excuse	 for	 not	 forging	 ahead.	 The	 ADF	
surely	 owes	 it	 to	 itself	 to	 become	 more	 serious	 about	 scholarly	 research	 on	 one	 of	 its	 most	 important	
elements	of	professionalism.	Wherever	 the	 research	 is	 conducted—within	 and	by	 the	 institution	 itself	 (for	
example,	at	the	Australian	Defence	College	or	Australian	Defence	Force	Academy)	and/or	through	programs	












There	 is	nothing	 in	 this	 review	 that	would	be	alien	 to	a	military	professional.	The	 ‘new	 look’	 that	 the	ADF	
seeks	can	be	best	realised	by	concentration	on	some	‘old	basics’.	
	




The	utility	 of	 the	3Rs	model	 goes	 beyond	 its	 application	 in	 diversity	management.	Reflecting,	 relating	 and	
reinforcing	are	 important	not	 just	 to	build	a	 sense	of	 collective	 identity,	 self‐efficacy	and	commitment	 to	a	
certain	 set	 of	 values	 or	 certain	 group	 outcome.	 The	 three	 elements	 have	 equal	 relevance	 to	 the	 overall	
process	of	leadership	itself.	They	are	particularly	relevant	for	establishing	the	conditions	in	which	leaders	and	




Potential	vulnerabilities	exist,	however,	and	 it	 is	disappointing	 that	 the	paucity	of	 relevant	research	means	




                                                 













The	 demonstration	 of	 normatively	 appropriate	 conduct	 through	 personal	 actions	 and	 interpersonal	



































 Cognition	 trust,	 based	 on	 performance‐relevant	 cognitions	 such	 as	 competence,	 responsibility,	
reliability	and	dependability;	or	
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